Fatores Determinantes do Pagamento de Dividendos no Brasil by Forti, Cristiano Augusto Borges et al.
R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 26, n. 68, p. 167-180, mai./jun./jul./ago. 2015 167
Determinant Factors of Dividend Payments in Brazil*
Cristiano Augusto Borges Forti 
Universidade Federal de Uberlândia, Faculdade de Gestão e Negócios, Uberlândia, MG, Brazil
Fernanda Maciel Peixoto
Universidade Federal de Uberlândia, Faculdade de Gestão e Negócios, Uberlândia, MG, Brazil  
Denis Lima e Alves 
Universidade Federal de Uberlândia, Faculdade de Gestão e Negócios, Uberlândia, MG, Brazil
Received on 12.11.2013 – Desk Acceptance on 01.03.2014 – 3rd version accepted on 01.08.2015
ABSTRACT
This study identifies factors that shaped cash disbursement distribution policies employed by Brazilian public companies listed on the 
Brazilian Securities, Commodities and Futures Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA) from 1995 to 2011. Relationships between Dividends/Total 
Assets and potential determinants discussed in the literature, including firm size, corporate governance, profitability, leverage, market to 
book, liquidity, investment, risk, profit growth, information asymmetry and agency conflict, are examined. The following econometric 
methods are employed: (1) Tobit, given the nature of the dividend data, and (2) the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to control 
for endogenous regressors. Significant positive variables found include size, return on assets (ROA), market to book, liquidity and profit 
growth. It can thus be inferred that larger firm size, profitability, market value, liquidity and profit growth correlate with greater firm pro-
pensity to distribute money to shareholders, thus supporting the theory of corporate finance. Significant negative variables found include 
leverage, liquidity squared, capex, beta and tag along 100%. It is thus inferred that more significantly leveraged companies that invest more 
heavily in fixed assets and that exhibit high liquidity, higher risk and less conflict between controlling and minority shareholders will be 
less likely to pay dividends to shareholders.
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 1 INTRODUCTION
policies based on a broader set of variables, accounting 
for characteristics of the Brazilian legal environment 
and employing robust econometric approaches to divi-
dend sampling.
Using Economática, BM&FBOVESPA and Brazilian 
Securities Commission (CVM) data, all activity sectors 
are analyzed with the exception of the financial sector 
given its capital structure peculiarities and restricted 
and differentiated regulations.
The present study is novel in that it (a) employs the 
Dividends/Total Assets ratio as a dependent variable 
rather than the Dividends/Net Income ratio3, as total 
assets are more stable than earnings and dividend flows 
(Lintner, 1956); (b) broadens the scope of independent 
variables, which include firm size, corporate gover-
nance, return, leverage, market value, liquidity, invest-
ments, risk, growth, ownership concentration, agency 
conflicts and signaling; and (c) compares the results of 
Tobit and GMM calculations.
The focus on this study is justified given the evi-
dent association between dividend policies and nearly 
all other organizational financial decisions. Decisions 
regarding the volume of distributed funds affect levera-
ge, the volume of investments, the volume of available 
cash, mergers and acquisitions, and other factors. Thus, 
understanding this policy can help elucidate other de-
cisions that companies make, such as those related to 
capital structures, asset pricing and capital budgets, 
while also introducing a new perspective on corporate 
finance and on the protection of minority shareholders.
According to the results of this study, the distribu-
tion of funds to shareholders by the Brazilian compa-
nies examined follows classical theories of finance, 
where (a) firm size, returns, market to book, liquidity, 
control and profit growth exhibit significant positive 
relationships with the propensity for companies to pay 
dividends and (b) leverage, corporate governance, risk 
and information asymmetry exhibit significant negative 
relationships with dividend payments.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 provi-
des a theoretical review of Brazilian and international 
studies on firm dividend policies. Section 3 presents 
the study research methodology, section 4 describes the 
study results, and section 5 presents conclusions.
Dividend policies vary widely across companies and 
sectors, and their effect on company value remains in-
conclusive among finance researchers. In conjunction 
with investment and financing policies, dividend poli-
cies form one of the three most important areas of de-
cision making in corporate finance. Identifying factors 
that determinant firm cash distribution and cash hol-
ding decisions is of critical importance to financial ma-
nagers, investors and market regulatory bodies.
Which factors determinant dividend distribution 
policies employed by Brazilian public companies lis-
ted on the BM&FBOVESPA? In this article, we seek to 
answer this question by examining factors that may sha-
pe such corporate decisions. This study thus identifies, 
among determinant factors of cash disbursement distri-
bution presented in relevant literature, critical factors 
in the Brazilian context through a study of the 1995-
2011 period.
Studies on dividend policies in Brazil require speci-
fic attention, as incident tax systems on dividends di-
ffer from those adopted in the countries examined in 
most seminal studies on the subject, such as the U.S., 
England, Germany and Japan. Brazil also employs in-
terest on equity, creating various company tax options 
for profit distribution. Mandatory minimum dividends 
may also affect firm dividend payments through legal 
obligation. Thus, literature on dividends in Brazil se-
eks to identify the effects of these characteristics on the 
behaviors of firms and their managers. 
The heterogeneity of the Brazilian landscape serves 
as a research opportunity, enabling one to identify uni-
que tax and legislation variants when evaluating me-
chanisms of cash distribution to shareholders. We thus 
examine overall cash distribution trends rather than 
dividends or interest on equity, as motivations behind 
distribution through one form or another are not a fo-
cus of this study1.
Most empirical studies on this topic in the context 
of Brazil have not employed econometric methodolo-
gies adjusted to the sampling distribution of dividen-
ds2. Following Heineberg and Procianoy’s (2003) study, 
which examined determinants of cash disbursement 
policies employed in Brazilian firms from 1994 to 2000, 
we further knowledge of national company dividend 
1  We use the word dividend to denote the distribution of cash flow to shareholders regardless of how payments are made. We focus on the distribution of cash flow and motivations that shape it.
2  Dividends have distributions with many values equal to zero, and these are omitted because they include no negative dividends.
3  Heineberg and Procianoy (2003) used the absolute dividend value as the dependent variable. However, several studies on dividend factors have employed relative variables (ratios) to study dividends, including 
Mayne (1980), Rozeff (1982), Dickens, Casey, and Newman (2002) and Kania and Bacon (2005).
 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Among pioneering studies on corporate dividend 
trends, Lintner (1956) conducts his studies over two 
phases: (a) an initial phase involving interviews with 
the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of 28 large U.S. 
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companies and (b) an empirical phase that involves exa-
mining panel data for the companies studied and evalu-
ating dividend trends via econometric models.
Among other findings, Lintner (1956) states that 
shareholders prefer the stability of dividends and that 
the market rewards company shares with stability or an 
increasing (gradual) rate of dividends. Moreover, Lint-
ner (1956) observes that managers use current earnings 
to determine when dividends must change. In addition, 
the author found that managers first define dividend 
policies and that other policies on issues such as invest-
ments, debts and cash holdings are defined based on a 
given volume of dividends. In short, the author found 
that managers of U.S. firms view dividends as a reflec-
tion of profit growth sustainability.
A number of years later, Miller and Modigliani 
(1961) showed that the distribution of dividends is irre-
levant to determining a company’s value in the absen-
ce of market imperfections and that this value should 
be influenced only by firm investment decisions. Since 
this conclusion was made, the majority of studies on 
dividends have sought to address various market im-
perfections that affect dividend policies, such as taxes, 
agency costs, information asymmetries, clientele effects 
and behavioral models. Studies on this topic are thus 
concerned with the “Dividend Puzzle” first coined by 
Black (1976).
The majority of studies on dividends have since 
examined the following: (a) Tax effects: potential rela-
tionships are sought between payment forms and sha-
reholder preferences based on their tax situation (Miller 
& Scholes, 1982); (b) Risk effects: it is argued that divi-
dends can alter a company’s value due to uncertainties 
surrounding future firm cash flow delivery (Gordon, 
1963; Black & Scholes, 1974); (c) Clientele effects: it is 
argued that all companies can attract specific types of 
investor depending on the way profits are distributed 
(Miller & Modigliani, 1961; Black & Scholes, 1974); (d) 
Effects of agency costs: it is argued that shareholders 
must encourage the distribution of available funds to 
reduce free cash flows at the manager’s disposal (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Moh’d, Perry & Rimbey, 1995); and 
(e) Effects of information asymmetries: such effects are 
based on dividend policy informational content used 
by the company (Grullon, Michaely & Swaminathan, 
2002). 
Rozeff (1982) examined dividend payment effects 
and developed a payout ratio model that is consistent 
and robust for use in both time periods and in different 
sectors of the economy. In his model, Rozeff (1982) iden-
tifies five significant variables that generate expected 
behaviors: (a) beta, (b) percentage of insider ownership, 
(c) growth rate of past earnings, (d) growth rate of pre-
dicted profits and (e) number of common shareholders. 
Dickens, Casey and Newman (2002) similarly argue that 
explanatory factors of dividends must be considered, as 
the intrinsic model of asset valuation maintains that sto-
ck prices are determined by present dividend values.
Kania and Bacon (2005) also suggest that dividends 
serve as an indicator of a company’s present and future 
performance, even of its potential susceptibility to risk. 
The authors found significant positive associations be-
tween payout and profit growth and debt. By contrast, 
they found significant negative relationships between 
payout, risk, Capex, insider ownership and liquidity.
The existence of insider ownership and the number 
of common shareholders in dividends models spurred 
research on the relationship between dividend policies 
and mechanisms of corporate governance. Such stu-
dies include Dalmatius and Corrar (2007), Setia-At-
maja, Tanewski, and Skully (2009), Jo and Pan (2009) 
and Holland and Coelho (2012). Dalmácio and Corrar 
(2007) studied the relationship between shareholder 
control concentrations and the dividend policies of 
438 Brazilian companies listed on the São Paulo Stock 
Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo – BOVESPA) 
from 1998 to 2005. The authors found that an increase 
in shareholder concentration raises the value of divi-
dends paid per share. 
Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) examined whether public 
family companies in Australia use dividends, debts and 
board structures to exaggerate or minimize agency pro-
blems between controlling and minority shareholders 
in capital market environments with high investor pro-
tection and private control benefits. The authors found 
that relative to companies not controlled by families, 
family businesses employ higher dividend payout rates 
and lower levels of board independence.
Following this line of inquiry, Jo and Pan (2009) 
examined the relationship between managerial entren-
chment and dividend policies for U.S. industrial firms 
from 1990 to 2003. The authors adopted Logit and To-
bit estimators to measure managerial entrenchment via 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s (2003) G index of gover-
nance. They found that firms with entrenched mana-
gers are more likely to pay dividends and that doing so 
lowers cash holdings, thus rendering firms more vulne-
rable to hostile takeovers. 
In examining publicly traded Brazilian firms for the 
period of 1998 to 2010, Holanda and Coelho (2012) stu-
died whether characteristics external to the company 
that are representative of the clientele effect differentiate 
company dividend policies. The authors adopted logis-
tic regression and Tobit methods to determine whether 
an association exists between decisions to declare divi-
dends and clientele effects. Ownership concentrations 
were found to most heavily affect earnings distribution 
policies among the companies studied.
It is important to clarify that the U.S. – which most 
theories and studies on this subject are based on – em-
ploys different tax laws than Brazil with regards to di-
vidend policy. Brazilian legislation on the matter di-
ffers in that (a) shareholder dividend receipt does not 
generate taxes4; (b) mandatory minimum dividends are 
4  Capital gains taxation is similar to that employed in the countries of origin in the studies on dividends.
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employed; and (c) interest on equity that is deductible 
from the profit tax base of the distributing company, 
but which generates taxes for receiving shareholders, is 
used an additional avenue of funds distribution.
Thus, studies on dividend policies of Brazilian com-
panies adapt models employed by international authors 
to the context of Brazilian legislation and macroeco-
nomics. Such studies have examined tax issues5 (Brito 
& Rietti, 1981), the volume and frequency of dividend 
payments (Heineberg & Procianoy, 2003), the impact of 
mandatory minimum dividends (Paiva & Lima, 2001; 
Martin & Novaes, 2012), dividend effects on invest-
ments (Martins & Novaes, 2012), clientele effects (Ho-
landa & Coelho, 2012), share repurchasing (Gabrielli & 
Saito, 2003), the effects of dividend payment announce-
ments (Novis Neto & Saito, 2003), the use of pecking or-
der theory (Brito & Silva, 2005), and effects on interest 
on equity (Paiva & Lima, 2001), among others.
Regarding the determinants of dividend payments, 
studies by Heineberg & Procianoy (2003) and Fonteles, 
Peixoto, Vasconcelos, & De Luca (2012) are notable. Hei-
neberg & Procianoy (2003) sought to identify determi-
nants of the cash disbursement policies6 of public Brazi-
lian companies for 1994 to 2000. The authors found that 
profit and cash disbursement in the previous year have 
the strongest effect on cash disbursement in a given year. 
Fonteles et al. (2012) examined the profiles of firms be-
longing to the Dividend Index (Índice Dividendos - IDIV) 
of the BM&FBOVESPA and studied potential determinants 
of high dividend policies. The study sample included 35 
companies registered under the IDIV portfolio in October 
of 2011. Employing Bird in Hand and Signaling Theories, 
the authors evaluated eight variables central to dividend 
policies, namely, shareholder control concentration, cash 
flow, company size, activity sector, listing segment, insti-
tutional capital, and distributed profit and growth. These 
variables were grouped under four categories: 1 - Concen-
tration; 2 - Profitability; 3 - Prosperity; and 4 - Sector. The 
authors found dividend policies determined by law to be 
the ones observed by most companies.
Table 1 presents factors cited in the literature that 
may influence dividend behaviors.
5  In Brazil, dividends are tax-exempt for the investor, and there is an interest on equity figure that, in turn, is taxed by the investor but that causes a reduction in the company’s tax burden.
6  As mentioned, in the Brazilian context, cash disbursement include dividends and interest on equity.
Factors References Influence on Dividends
Growth La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer & Vishny (2000), Mota 
(2007)
High growth rates should be reflected in a reduction in dividend payouts, as 
managers must finance growth, preferably with their own funds.
Agency Costs Jensen & Meckling (1976), Rozeff 
(1982)
Higher agency costs correlate with higher dividend payouts to mitigate related 
conflicts.
Information Asymmetry Grullon, Michaely & Swaminathan 
(2002)
The greater the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders is, 
the greater the latter’s desire for dividends.
Risk Gordon (1963), Bernardo & Ikeda 
(2013).
Higher risks associated with company cash flows correlate with lower 
dividends, as managers must avoid the withdrawal of company funds that may 
be needed in the future.
Control Loss & Sarlo Neto (2003), 
Dalmácio & Corrar (2007)
This involves three factors: (a) companies controlled by holdings should pay 
higher dividends, as economic groups face fewer cash flow risks than individual 
companies; (b) companies enjoying concentrated shareholder control can 
pay fewer dividends if minority shareholder expropriation is present and vice 
versa; and (c) companies of greater shareholding dispersion should pay fewer 
dividends, as managers tend to protect company funds to secure their own 
interests.
Investments La Porta et al. (2000), Mota (2007) Higher company investment rates correlate with lower dividends, as they drain 
company funds needed to finance investments.
Profitability Francis, Schipper & Vicent (2005) Companies with higher returns on equity (ROE) should distribute fewer 
dividends, as this serves as a better investment option for shareholders. 
However, higher ROE companies can make more consistent payments to 
shareholders by financing growth while still remunerating shareholders.
Size Mota (2007) Size and maturity factors can affect dividends. Larger, more mature 
companies tend to pay higher dividends than companies that are growing and 
consolidating in the market.
Prepared by the authors.
Table 1   Summary of factors that influence dividend payments
Factors that affect manager decision of dividends 
initiation or modification remain unknown. From a 
review of national and international study results and 
existing research gaps, this article contributes new em-
pirical evidence to the literature on the subject, using 
appropriate econometric tools to evaluate determinants 
of firm dividend policies.
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A database was compiled from Economática, Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores 
Mobiliários - CVM) and BM&FBOVESPA data. The 
first source provided financial statements (balance she-
ets, income statements, cash flows, statements of sour-
ces and applications of funds). The second and third 
sources provided information on corporate governance 
and other data such as firm establishment dates. The 
sample includes annual observations of all companies 
listed on the BM&FBOVESPA from 1995 to 2011. The 
financial sector was excluded, forming a final sample 
of 300 companies and 3,671 observations for an un-
balanced panel with an average of 12.2 observations 
per company7. To correct possible inaccuracies due to 
extreme observations (outliers), data were winsorized 
to 0.025. As noted in Section 1, distinctions were not 
made between dividend and interest on equity payment 
amounts. We use cash disbursement and dividends to 
measure the total of cash distributed to shareholders re-
gardless of payment method used8. Variables that may 
affect dividend policies used on this study are presented 
below. Formulas and calculations are shown in Table 2.
 ◆ Size: Based on the results of previous studies (Renne-
boog & Trojanowski, 2011; Moh’d et al., 1995), larger 
companies are expected to be more likely to pay divi-
dends than smaller companies. 
 ◆ ROA – Return on Assets: It is expected that more 
profitable companies will pay higher dividends than 
others (Kania & Bacon, 2005; John & Knyazeva, 2006).
 ◆ Leverage: The finance literature largely attributes the 
relationship between dividends and leverage to signa-
ling effects. An increase in company debt levels would 
serve as a credible signal that the company anticipates 
high future cash flows. In this context, managers would 
pay higher dividends to confirm this signal. Given cau-
se and effect relationships between variables, leverage 
lagged over one period is employed (Casey & Dickens, 
2000; Jensen, Solberg & Zorn, 1992). However, other 
authors claim that there is an inverse relationship be-
tween leverage and payout. Therefore, in principle, the 
expected sign of leverage cannot be determined.
 ◆ Market to Book: Markets are expected to identify com-
panies that offer superior present and future cash flows 
to shareholders (Speranzini, 1994). A positive sign is 
anticipated.
 ◆ Liquidity: Represents a company’s overall liquidity 
level. Companies with greater liquidity offer more se-
curity so that managers can maintain or even increase 
dividend payout levels. A positive sign is thus anticipa-
ted (Acharya & Viswanathan, 2011).
 ◆ Liquidity2: This variable is intended to account for 
non-linear liquidity behaviors in two respects. First, 
firms with higher levels of liquidity may reach this 
level through dividend restrictions. Second, there may 
be a threshold at which liquidity maintenance begins 
to restrict dividend payments. Hence, a negative sign is 
expected (Acharya & Viswanathan, 2011).
 ◆ Capex: This refers to the investment or growth rate of 
firm fixed assets. Companies engaging in numerous 
investments are typically required to retain profits to 
finance investments without altering debt levels. There-
fore, a negative sign is anticipated (La Porta, Lopez-
-De-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000; Mota, 2007).
 ◆ Beta: Indicates the systematic risk of a firm. As mana-
gers are reluctant to increase dividends in the present 
and must reduce them in the future (Lintner, 1956), 
companies facing greater risks are assumed to be more 
reluctant to pay high dividends. A negative sign is thus 
anticipated (Rozeff, 1982; Bernardo & Ikeda, 2013).
 ◆ Profit Growth: Managers support an increase in divi-
dends when guaranteed higher future cash flows (Lint-
ner, 1956). Companies exhibiting higher levels of profit 
growth should mitigate uncertainties facing managers 
and pay more dividends. A positive sign is anticipated 
(Francis, Schipper & Vicent, 2005).
 ◆ Adherence to the BM&FBOVESPA’s Distinctive Levels 
of Corporate Governance (Níveis diferenciados de 
Governança Corporativa - NDGC): BM&FBOVESPA 
has four distinctive listing segments for companies that 
agree to undertake voluntary corporate rules on each 
segment such as issue only common shares, exhibit 
greater levels of transparency and employ minimum 
free float policies. It is hypothesized that such compa-
nies pay lower dividends than those belonging to the 
traditional market (Fonteles, Peixoto, Vasconcelos & 
De Luca, 2012; Holland & Coelho, 2012). The dummy 
for the “traditional” segment was not included in the 
model to serve as a basis for comparison with other 
governance variables and to avoid the “dummy variable 
trap.” Therefore, a negative sign is anticipated for all 
levels of governance.
 ◆ 100% Tag Along: Companies with this voluntary con-
cession mitigate agency conflicts between controlling 
and minority shareholders. Giving minority sharehol-
ders better co-sale rights than required by law, allows 
a reduction on the demand for dividends by them 
(Grullon et al., 2002).
 ◆ Poison Pill: Companies employing a poison pill clause 
exhibit more dispersed shareholding tendencies. 
Dispersed shareholding patterns correlate with less 
shareholder power over managers. It is thus necessary 
 3 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
7 The number of observations was reduced to 3,242, as the first observations for each company were lost by calculating variation variables with profit and Capex growth rates.
8 Boulton, Braga-Alves & Shastri (2012) claim that a company's total payout is not affected by the presence or absence of payments using interest on equity form and that a company only identifies the most 
appropriate form of shareholder payment in relation to company tax planning needs.
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to maintain lower dividends to enjoy private benefits of 
control. A negative sign is anticipated (Vieira, Martins 
& Fávero, 2009).
 ◆ (Dividends/Total Assets): This is the dependent 
variable. It is calculated by dividing the sum of divi-
dends and interest on equity by the total assets (May-
ne, 1980). It represents the relative level of cash flows 
distributed to shareholders. The choice of Total Assets 
(TA) denominator instead of the profit was due to the 
high variation of the latter that is not always accompa-
nied by a change in dividends9. Using TA as a denomi-
nator prevents the development of non-existent varia-
tions in the dependent variable, as dividends behave in 
a more linear trend over time (Lintner, 1956)10.
Data on the variables presented above were available 
for all companies included in the sample. Additional va-
riables were collected to identify the characteristics of 
companies that pay higher or lower dividends. However, 
these variables were obtained for a random sample of 
102 companies of the 300 firms included in the original 
sample. The following additional variables were used:
 ◆ Age: More mature companies tend to exhibit more 
stable cash flows. Age is also related to more heavily 
consolidated products and processes, and also with 
shareholders with more forceful demands on the 
distribution of cash flows. A positive sign is anticipated 
(Gu, Lee & Rosett, 2005).
 ◆ Majority Control: Companies with a defined con-
troller, whether through a shareholder agreement or 
through the concentration of sufficient common shares 
for shareholder control of the company. In such cases, 
the majority shareholder has greater power over the 
managers in the definition of dividends. A positive 
sign is anticipated (Dalmácio & Corrar, 2007).
 ◆ CEO & BD: Companies in which the CEO and Chair-
man of the Board of Directors are the same person. 
This may suggest the existence of two factors that 
increase the probability of higher dividends: (a) the 
CEO and President are the same person, and typically, 
this CEO is also the main shareholder of the company; 
(b) this may reflect low corporate governance (CG) 
quality, requiring the payment of higher dividends to 
shareholders to mitigate conflicts between sharehol-
ders (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). A positive sign 
is thus anticipated when no separation of duties is 
present (Almeida, 2012).
Based on the variables presented, two econometric 
models were assembled: the first covers variables avai-
lable for all companies, and the second extended model 
includes additional variables but fewer observations.
Model 1: Dividends/Total Assetsi,t = α + Sizei,t +ROAi,t + 
Leveragei,t-1 + Market toBooki,t + Liquidityi,t + Liquidity2i,t + 
Capexi,t + Betai,t + Profit Growthi,t + New Marketi,t + Level 
1i,t + Level 2i,t + BOVESPA Maisi,t + Tag Along100i,t + Poison 
Pillsi,t + Si +dt + εi,t
Extended Model 1: Dividends/Total Assetsi,t = α + Sizei,t 
+ ROAi,t + Leveragei,t-1 + Market toBooki,t + Liquidityi,t 
+ Liquidity2i,t + Capexi,t + Betai,t + Profit Growthi,t + New 
Marketi,t + Level 1i,t + Level 2i,t + BOVESPA Maisi,t + 
Tag Along100i,t + Agei,t + PoisonPillsi,t + MajControli,t + 
CEO&BDi,t + Si +dt + εi,t
i and t represent the company and year, respectively. 
α, S, d and ε represent the intercept, sector dummies, 
year dummies and error term, respectively. Definitions, 
formulas, and expected signs for the variables used are 
presented in Table 2.
The fact that cash disbursement values are equal to 
zero in 34% of the sample observations interferes with 
the study methodology. In addition, values of zero are 
omitted, i.e., companies experiencing financial difficul-
ty cannot raise funds in the form of negative dividends. 
The Tobit method was thus used, following methods 
presented by Barclay, Smith, & Watts (1995) and Di-
ckens et al. (2002).
Regression assumptions of heteroscedasticity, nor-
mality, and multicollinearity were treated as follows: the 
first with White’s (1980) matrix to yield robust error va-
lues; the second with an analysis of possible correction 
variables via logarithmic transformation; and the third 
with variance inflation analyses of regressions that did 
not generate any variable with a value exceeding five, 
where the literature indicates a value 10 as the limit.
OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) and Panel (Fixed Effects 
and Random Effects) models do not appear to be adequa-
te when using numerous observations that are equal to 
zero and omitted data, as in the case of dividends. Their 
use can generate underestimated and inconsistent coeffi-
cients. However, the Tobit method performs adequately 
under such conditions (Barclay, Smith & Watts, 1995).
The Tobit method is suitable for samples with 30% 
or more observations censored. As 34% of the sample 
observations fall under this category, the Tobit method 
is the most appropriate one in this case. Specification 
tests for the Tobit model show that the model is consis-
tent and that estimators differ from zero at a significan-
ce level of 1%.
Nevertheless, one of the most significant econo-
metric problems faced in studies on corporate finance 
concerns issues of endogeneity. ROA, Leverage, Payout, 
Liquidity and Capex variables are difficult to control 
for effects of reverse causality. Such variables are un-
derstood as a result of simultaneous business decisions, 
and thus, it is difficult to identify cause-and-effect re-
lationships between them (Barros, Junior, Silveira & 
Bergmann, 2010). The Generalized Method of Moments 
9  Some companies distribute dividends even when experiencing losses. In such cases, while dividends are positive, payouts will become negative through division with a negative value, diametrically changing the 
regression results. Employing total assets as a denominator eliminates this bias.
10  The coefficient of variation (CV) of the variable (Dividends/Profit) is 35 times greater than the CV of the variable (Dividends/Total Assets) for the sample used in the present study. The CV is a statistical measure 
of dispersion that is suitable for comparing data dispersion levels over several scales.
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(GMM) method can be employed to address endogenei-
ty problems in corporate finance data. The GMM allows 
all model regressors to remain endogenous yet is still 
able to generate robust and efficient coefficients. Howe-
ver, the GMM method is not preferred when examining 
data that include numerous observations equal to zero.
The two methods (Tobit and GMM) can thus be 
used together to calculate coefficients of the proposed 
regression model, as each improves the reliability and 
robustness of the results in unique ways. In addition, it 
is anticipated that the results will be similar regardless 
of econometric methods used, suggesting that the pro-
posed model of dividend payments is consistent.
From this methodological rigor, our use of nume-
rous approaches, our treatment of variables and our in-
clusion of all relevant variables, we argue that this study 
contributes to the literature on dividends in Brazil. In 
addition, a robustness test was performed on the issue 
of mandatory dividends, which can introduce bias if not 
properly treated.
 4 RESULTS
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for model 1 
variables categorized into three groups: companies 
that do not pay dividends, companies that pay mode-
rate dividends and companies that pay high dividends. 
Companies that do not pay dividends are smaller, less 
profitable, have a market value lower than book value 
and exhibit low liquidity and greater risk. Companies 
that pay high dividends are larger and more heavily le-
veraged and present average liquidity levels and lower 
profit growth rates. The highest market value is asso-
ciated with moderate dividends, supporting the notion 
that the market pays a premium for dividend payments 
and that very high dividends may signify a lack of in-
vestment options.
Variable Expected Sign Description Operational Definition
Size (+) Company size Natural logarithm of the company’s total assets. 
ROA (+) Return on assets
Operating profit (before financial expenses) divided by total assets 
of the company.
Leverage (+/-) Company debt Total liabilities divided by shareholder equity.
Market to Book (+) Market to book Adjusted market value divided by the book value of the company.
Liquidity (+) Company liquidity Current assets divided by current liabilities.
Liquidity2 (+) Liquidity squared Company liquidity squared.
Capex (-) Investment rate in fixed assets Growth rate of fixed assets.
Beta (-) Systematic risk Company beta drawn from Economática.
Profit Growth (+) Growth rate of profits Current profits minus previous profits divided by previous profits.
Dividends/Total 
Assets
Cash disbursement paid in relation to the 
total assets of the company
Cash payments to shareholders divided by total assets. Dependent 
variable.
100% Tag Along (-)
Companies with 100% tag along for 
ordinary shares
Dummy variable with a value of one for companies adopting a tag 
along of 100%.
Age (+) Company age
Number of years between company establishment and data 
observation.
Governance Levels (-)
BM&FBOVESPA
level of governance 
Five dummy variables with a value of one for the respective level 
of governance and with a value of zero for the others. The levels 
are New Market, Level 1, Level 2, BOVESPA Mais and Traditional. 
The traditional variable was omitted from the model to disable the 
“dummy variable trap”.
Poison Pills (-) Company has poison pills
Dummy variable with a value of one for firms employing a poison 
pills clause in their bylaws.
Maj. Control (+) Company has majority control
Dummy variable with a value of one for companies that have a 
majority controller and with a value of zero to indicate dispersed 
shareholding.
CEO & BD (+)
The CEO and the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors are the same person
Dummy variable with a value of one for companies in which the 
CEO and Chairman of the Board are the same person.
Note: This table presents the regression variables. The first column lists terms used in econometric models, the second lists the hypothesized sign, the third describes 
the variable, and the fourth presents operational definitions. 
Table 2   Description of regression variables
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Figure 1 presents descriptive statistics for model 1 
and extended model 1 categorical variables. A major 
“time-variant” change is evident, signifying that these 
variables can help explain dividend variance. The 100% 
Tag Along and variables for the BM&FBOVESPA levels 
of governance since 2001 (the year when the system 
came into force) are noteworthy.
Figure 2 presents descriptive statistics for the con-
tinuous variables. To conduct a more detailed analy-
sis of dividend policies adopted in the companies, the 
sample was divided into two subgroups: companies that 
pay higher dividends and companies that pay lower di-
vidends. The sample was accordingly divided into four 
quartiles based on Payout/Total Assets relationship. 
The figure only lists companies of the first and fourth 
quartiles. The figure shows that companies that pay hi-
gher dividends are larger, are more profitable, exhibit 
higher liquidity, and enjoy higher market value and pro-
fit growth trends. 
Payout = 0 0 < Payout < 0.7 Payout > 0.7 All
Number of Companies 92 166 42 300
Mean Total Assets (M.M.) 1.369 5.702 7.463 4.475
Mean ROA -.0136 .0872 .0779 .0519
Mean Leverage 2.00 1.69 2.34 1.88
Mean Market to Book .862 1.688 1.416 1.373
Mean Liquidity 1.32 2.06 1.64 1.76
Mean Capex .245 .229 .165 .225
Mean Beta .94 .70 .87 .80
Mean Profit Growth -.31 -.16 -.56 -.26
Source: Study results.
Table 3   Descriptive statistics of the variables
Note: The sample includes all firms listed on the BM&FBOVESPA from 1995 to 2011, with the exception of financial companies. Values represent the percentage of 
companies in relation to all companies of the sample for each year. CEO & BD and Maj. Control variables were evaluated for a sample of 102 companies selected 
randomly from the full sample. 
 Figure 1  Descriptive statistics for the categorical variables 
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Regression results are shown in Table 4. Columns 1 
and 2 show the coefficients of model 1 based on To-
bit and GMM estimators, respectively. Column 3 shows 
the coefficients of extended model 1 using Tobit esti-
mators. The coefficients suggest stability between the 
estimators. No significant coefficient presented conflic-
ting signal when compared to the other methods used. 
Tobit coefficients, as expected, are higher than GMM 
coefficients, as the Tobit method more effectively treat 
values equal to zero. Specification tests including the F 
and Chi2 tests did not produce results that invalidate the 
results, which are discussed below.
Size, ROA, Leverage, Market to Book, Liquidity, Li-
quidity2, Capex, Beta and Profit Growth variables were 
significant and presented the same sign across all me-
thods and models used. Poison Pills and 100% Tag Along 
variables were significant, but not in all variations. All 
variables with significant coefficients also presented the 
expected signs according to finance theory, supporting 
the adequacy of the theoretical model. A ceteris paribus 
analysis for each variable was conducted: variable Size 
showed a positive relationship with dividend payments, 
indicating that larger firms are more likely to pay di-
vidends (Mota, 2007). This variable is also interpreted 
as an indication of company maturity, suggesting that 
larger and more mature companies are more likely to 
pay dividends, as they are not presented with as many 
opportunities to engage in new investments or are affor-
ded access to other funding sources, rendering it unne-
cessary to retain profits to make such investments.
The ROA, confirming Lintner’s (1956) theory, is po-
sitive with the highest coefficients. Managers are more 
inclined to pay dividends when a company enjoys hi-
gher profitability and returns on investments. In addi-
tion, shareholders themselves expect higher dividends 
when a company is more profitable.
Leverage was found to be negatively correlated with 
dividends, indicating that higher company leverage le-
vels in the preceding year correlate with lower dividen-
ds in the following year, confirming that an increase in 
debt serves as a credible sign that a company anticipates 
high future cash flows (Jensen et al., 1992).
The relationship between Market to Book factors and 
dividends was found to be significant, presenting a po-
sitive sign, as noted in the literature. These results are 
consistent with those of Lintner (1956), who states that 
the market pays a premium for shares of companies that 
pay higher dividends. On the one hand, it is assumed 
that a company that pays higher dividends is evaluated 
more favorably in the market, increasing its Market to 
Book value. On the other hand, it is assumed that such 
a company would already have exhibited high Market 
to Book values for other reasons (market shares, signed 
contracts, patents, etc.) and that the managers of these 
firms, interested in publicizing firm capacities to contri-
bute future cash flows to the market, will increase their 
Note: This graph presents descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. For each variables used in the study, a graph was prepared with two lines. One depicts ave-
rage variable values for companies with high dividends, and the other depicts average variable values for companies with low dividends. Example: for variable size, the 
solid line shows the average size of companies with the highest Dividends/Total Assets ratio, and these therefore belong to the first quartile. The dotted line shows the 
average size of companies belonging to the fourth quartile, and these therefore pay the lowest dividends. The sample includes all firms listed on the BM&FBOVESPA 
from 1995 to 2011 with the exception of financial companies. 
 Figura 2  Descriptive statistics for the continuous variables
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dividends. Both hypotheses are plausible and related to 
publicizing future firm cash generation capacities.
The Liquidity variable was found to be positive and 
significant, indicating that dividend payments are po-
sitively related to fund availability. As profitability is 
controlled by the ROA variable, liquidity is not affected 
by the availability of cash provided exclusively by the 
most profitable companies. Companies that are not as 
profitable but that are in a comfortable financial situ-
ation (high volumes of available cash) pay higher divi-
dends. This may explain Lintner’s (1956) observation 
that managers tend to resist dividend reduction, even 
when company results are inconsistent.
The Liquidity2 variable was found to have a signifi-
cant negative sign, suggesting that dividend payments 
decline as liquidity increases. Both the Liquidity and 
Liquidity2 coefficient results suggest the presence of 
non-linear liquidity behaviors in relation to dividen-
ds, and the negative sign of the latter corresponds to 
a downward sloping line, indicating that maintaining 
high levels of liquidity entails sacrificing dividends paid 
to shareholders. This result confirms the existence of 
an optimal liquidity threshold for dividend payments, 
beyond which dividends decline as liquidity increases.
The Capex variable was found to be negative, con-
firming that firms engaged in more investments exhibit 
lower payout tendencies. The coefficients obtained are 
robust for all companies included in the sample but may 
become biased upon evaluation due to (a) the inclusion 
of companies from various sectors that do not always 
require Capex investments, potentially affecting sector 
control variables, and (b) a need for constant invest-
ment on the part of Brazilian companies, as Brazil is a 
developing country.
The Beta variable was found to be negative and sig-
nificant as expected, indicating that higher risks cha-
racteristic of a certain sector correlate with lower firm 
tendencies to pay dividends (Gordon, 1963; Bernard & 
Ikeda, 2013). Coefficients approaching a value of zero 
do not denote an insignificant variable. Rather, they in-
dicate that beta effects on payout levels are negligible 
and/or that the scales used are too small.
The Profit Growth variable was found to be positive 
and significant, indicating that managers use dividends 
to signal future company profit growth trends, as pro-
fitability is controlled by the ROA variable (La Porta et 
al., 2000; Mota, 2007).
The Poison Pills coefficient was found to have a ne-
gative sign, as expected, but without statistical signifi-
cance. This may suggest that (a) another model variable 
is affecting the shareholding dispersion or that (b) the 
most widely dispersed Brazilian companies do not di-
ffer significantly from those that are not dispersed in 
terms of dividend payments.
The 100% Tag Along variable was also found to be 
negative, as expected. The variable’s consistency sug-
gests that it may wield signaling power in competing 
with dividends. As the 100% Tag Along variable for 
common shares is reflective of a right that can never be 
exercised by shareholders, it may be adopted to mitigate 
agency conflicts without entailing the high costs asso-
ciated with dividend payment.
(cont.)
Dependent Variable Dividends/Total Assets Div/Profits High Dividends
Expected (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sign Tobit GMM Tobit(E) Tobit(2) Payout> 40% Payout> 70%
Size (+) 0.0024*** 0.0019* 0.0025*** 0.1114*** 0.5318*** 0.4871***
(5.27) (1.67) (2.92) (12.16) (6.14) (5.04)
ROA (+) 0.1474*** 0.0789*** 0.2315*** 2.2230*** 6.0533*** 4.9924***
(15.04) (8.25) (11.96) (15.55) (8.78) (7.04)
Leverage (L1) (+/-) -0.0011*** -0.0031*** -0.0016*** -0.0096** -0.0077 0.0059
(-5.87) (-6.44) (-4.60) (-2.55) (-0.48) (0.36)
Market to Book (+) 0.0028*** 0.0031*** 0.0018*** -0.0015 0.1124*** 0.0772*
(5.81) (6.01) (2.75) (-0.20) (3.00) (1.95)
Liquidity (+) 0.0228*** 0.0083*** 0.0086*** 0.5217*** 1.2718*** 1.4760***
(13.25) (5.04) (2.66) (15.48) (7.13) (7.33)
Liquidity2 (-) -0.0026*** -0.0009*** -0.0013*** -0.0656*** -0.1829*** 0.2119***
(-9.45) (-3.52) (-2.61) (-11.93) (-6.43) (-6.47)
Capex (-) -0.0032** -0.0026** -0.0064*** -0.0085 0.1409 0.2276*
(-2.41) (-2.41) (-3.16) (-0.33) (1.20) (1.72)
Beta (-) -0.0002** -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0035 -0.0083 -0.0049
(-2.43) (-2.72) (-2.78) (-1.63) (-1.05) (-0.59)
Profit Growth (+) 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0009*** 0.0169*** 0.0663*** 0.0522***
(3.58) (5.48) (2.87) (4.56) (4.20) (3.13)
Table 4   Determinant factors of dividend payments in Brazil
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The BM&FBOVESPA Listing Segments did not show 
consistent signs or significance in relation to the Tradi-
tional sector (omitted from the model for comparison). 
This suggests that participating companies limit infor-
mation asymmetries through adoption, but their mere 
presence in these segments does not suggest superior 
governance to that of companies not present in these 
segments.
Overall, model 1 identified several factors that affect 
dividend payments of Brazilian companies listed on the 
BM&FBOVESPA. Through this analysis, it was possi-
ble to identify factors that affect company tendencies to 
distribute money to shareholders.
The results of the extended model 1, which inclu-
des additional variables, are shown in the third column 
of Table 4. As noted earlier, the additional variables re-
duced the number of firms and observations included 
(from 3,242 observations to 968). However, the Tobit 
model still maintained the significance of coefficients 
from model 1. The inclusion of additional variables to 
this model did not affect the results obtained from the 
analysis of model 1. The additional variables instead 
offer new information on factors that affect dividend 
payments by Brazilian companies. 
The Age variable had no effect on the distribution of 
dividends. This may be attributable in part to the time 
at which the company started to show higher growth. 
Our use of dates when firms went public rather than 
foundation dates may have also played a role in this ou-
tcome.
Maj. Control and CEO&BD values were significan-
tly positive, as expected. This suggests that companies 
with a majority controller and those led by a CEO who 
also serves as a Board of Directors chair offer higher 
dividend payments. This may be attributable to the fact 
that (1) such companies typically exhibit tense conflicts 
between majority and minority cohorts that may be re-
duced with an increase in dividend payments or (2) the 
concentration of power is sustained through the con-
centration of control that can increase dividends, whe-
ther through conflicts with minority shareholders or 
the controllers’ cash flow needs.
As a robustness test for the coefficient results found 
for model 1 and its extended version, an equivalent ver-
Note: This table presents Tobit regressions with (1) panel, (2) GMM and (3) extended Tobit model data. The dependent variable is the cash disbursement value divided 
by Total Assets. Column 4 presents a model equivalent to models 1 and 2 but with the cash disbursement value divided by the Net Income as the dependent variable. 
Columns 5 and 6 show the results of the Logit regression. High Dividend values serve as the dependent variable in both models. A dummy variable equals one when 
the Payout (Dividends/Net Income) is greater than or equal to 40% in model 1 or 70% in model 2. This value is equal to zero when the payout value is less than 40% 
in model 1 and less than 70% in model 2. The sample includes all firms listed on the BM&FBOVESPA from 1995 to 2011, with the exception of companies in the 
financial sector. Absolute values of coefficient t statistics for the independent variables are presented in parentheses. Significance levels are as follows: * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Poison Pills (-) -0.0029 -0.0023 -0.0073*** -0.0572 -1.0114** -1.2413**
(-1.34) (-0.80) (-3.01) (-1.45) (-2.29) (-2.25)
100% Tag Along (-) -0.0086*** -0.0075*** 0.0002 -0.1533*** -0.7196** -1.1989***
(-3.95) (-3.09) (0.09) (-2.74) (-2.39) (-3.47)
New Market (-) 0.0006 0.0019 -0.0484 0.3610 0.5363
(0.22) (0.60) (-0.75) (1.00) (1.30)
Level 1 (-) -0.0049** -0.0036 -0.1008** 0.1450 -0.0197
(-2.40) (-1.26) (-2.05) (0.50) (-0.06)
Level 2 (-) 0.0063* 0.0052 0.0496 0.2504 0.6887
(1.83) (1.31) (0.75) (0.54) (1.30)
BOVESPA Mais (-) -0.0845 0.0329*** -1.6579 -10.9064 -13.5876
(.) (5.72) (.) (-0.00) (-0.00)
Age (+) -0.0000
(-0.73)
Maj. Control (+) 0.0041*
(1.89)
CEO&BD (+) 0.0193***
(5.76)
Constant -0.0549*** -0.0389*** -0.0275* -1.8475*** -10.673*** -10.199***
(-6.92) (-2.93) (-1.91) (-10.37) (-5.75) (-4.82)
Dummy for Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy for Sector Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3242 3242 968 3241 3242 3242
No. of Firms 300 300 102 300 300 300
Log-likelihood 3987.25 1512.95 -2364.10
Chi2 7172.26 316.57 266.69
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sion of model 1 was developed by replacing the (Divi-
dends)/Total Assets dependent variable with (Dividen-
ds)/Net Income. This version of the model is presented 
in column 4 of Table 4, and its results show high com-
patibility with the previous three columns. Significant 
variables presented in the fourth column do not differ 
from corresponding coefficients found in the first, se-
cond and third columns. This shows that the dependent 
variable did not affect the study results or introduce 
bias.
However, further analysis is necessary, as mandatory 
minimum dividends may have influenced the results 
presented. Martins & Novaes (2012) showed that man-
datory minimum dividends in Brazil do not negatively 
affect firm investment levels and that this mechanism 
would not be harmful. To corroborate Martins & Nova-
es’ (2012) findings, a complementary model was gene-
rated to study companies that pay more than mandatory 
minimum dividends. Brazilian law requires that com-
panies distribute at least 25% of their adjusted income 
in the form of dividends. Adjusted income records are 
difficult to access when only information provided in 
official statements is available. However, it can be con-
cluded with reasonable accuracy that a company that 
paid more than 40% of its net income paid more than 
the minimum required amount. Based on this assump-
tion, variables that affect very high dividend payments 
(i.e., 70% of net income) were evaluated to identify 
factors that cause companies to pay higher (40%) and 
much higher (70%) dividends than mandatory dividend 
levels. Two dummy variables with a value of one were 
created for payouts of above 40% and above 70%. Co-
lumns 5 and 6 of Table 4 present the regression results, 
which are derived from a logit model for panel data. 
The results indicate that large companies are more like-
ly to pay dividends above mandatory minimum levels, 
as the variable size was found to be significant at 1%. 
Profitability (ROA) was also found to be a significant 
determinant of high dividends. 
It is interesting to note that the Market to Book va-
riable generated results that complement finance theo-
ries. Companies that pay high dividends accounting for 
less than 70% of net income levels have a positive coe-
fficient that is significant at 1%, confirming Lintner’s 
(1956) hypotheses. However, companies that pay very 
high dividends (over 70% of profits) generate lower Ma-
rket to Book coefficients at 10% significance.
Explanations for this result are directly linked to fi-
nance theories, which state that such companies (1) are 
not engaged in adequate investment projects and thus 
distribute cash or (2) are experiencing a slow period but 
still maintain stable dividend levels, which is not well 
regarded in the market when it occurs repeatedly.
The overall liquidity variable remains positive and 
significant, showing that companies that pay high di-
vidends ceteris paribus maintain higher current assets. 
In contrast to Market to Book cases, companies that 
distribute dividends of 70% exhibit greater liquidity, 
and thus, companies must ensure that such payments 
will remain constant in the future to be able to pay very 
high dividends. Liquidity2, as expected, showed a ne-
gative coefficient, indicating that high liquidity is not 
related to high dividend payments. Dividend coeffi-
cients in excess of 70% (in absolute terms) suggest that 
high company liquidity correlates with lower company 
tendencies toward very high dividend payments. This 
suggests the existence of an optimal liquidity threshold 
for dividend payments, beyond which dividends start to 
decline as liquidity increases.
Profit Growth was found to have a significant po-
sitive coefficient for both dividend levels, suggesting 
that this variable has a favorable effect on high divi-
dend payments. Again, Lintner’s (1956) theories pre-
vail, as managers only increase dividends when faced 
with consistent prospects of future company cash flow 
growth. Companies that pay more than 70% of dividen-
ds present lower growth rates, accounting for the high 
payment results given the likely decline in investment 
opportunities.
Poison Pills were found to have a significant negati-
ve sign, generating a higher coefficient for companies 
that pay dividends above 70%. Hence, this clause, which 
maintains dispersed shareholding, helps managers re-
tain company funds due to the lower propensity to pay 
dividends.
The 100% Tag Along variable was also found to be 
negative and significant, as expected, indicating that 
this variable serves as a strong signal to investors while 
mitigating conflicts between controlling and minority 
shareholders. The variable thus accounts for part of the 
signal attributed to dividends.
Thus, Martins & Novaes’ (2012) findings are confir-
med; that is, one cannot infer differences in dividend 
policies between companies that pay high dividends 
and those that pay dividends approaching the manda-
tory minimum. 
 5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The objective of this study was to examine deter-
minants of dividend policies among Brazilian public 
companies for the 1995 to 2011 period, thus addressing 
several gaps in the literature on dividends in Brazil. 
The first research gap concerns methodological appro-
aches. Tobit and GMM model results were compared. 
The Tobit model was suitable to employ in this work, 
as 34% of the observations studied included dividends 
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equal to zero, given that OLS results may underestimate 
coefficients and/or overestimate intercepts under such 
conditions. To address issues of endogeneity, a recur-
rent theme in finance studies, the GMM estimator was 
employed, producing consistent coefficients in the pre-
sence of endogenous regressors.
A second gap in research concerns the extension 
of the econometric models currently used in studies 
on the determinants of dividend policy in Brazil. The 
present study thus examined market, governance and 
accounting variables, expanding results summarized by 
Martins & Fama (2012), Heineberg & Procianoy (2003) 
and Fonteles et al. (2012) on determinants of dividend 
policy in Brazil. The proposed model includes variables 
related to corporate governance, investment, risk, debt, 
signaling, agency conflict and liquidity to control for 
characteristic elements of the Brazilian stock market, 
and some of these variables had not previously been as-
sociated with dividend distribution policies in the Bra-
zilian literature.
The following variable was selected after a review of 
national and international literature: Dividends/Total 
Assets as a response variable, and the following indica-
tors were selected as explanatory variables: Size, ROA, 
Leverage, Market to Book, Liquidity, Capex, Beta, Pro-
fit Growth, Poison Pills, 100% Tag Along and Listing 
Segments. An extended model with additional variables 
was also analyzed. The additional variables were Age, 
Majority Control and a dummy for cases in which the 
CEO and Board of Director Chairman duties were per-
formed by the same person.
The overall analysis of Brazilian firm cash disburse-
ment distribution determinants showed that significant 
positive variables include Size, ROA, Market to Book, 
Liquidity and Profit Growth. That is, it can be inferred 
from this study that larger firm size, profitability, ma-
rket value, liquidity and profit growth levels correlate 
with a higher firm propensity to distribute cash to sha-
reholders, supporting the theory of corporate finance. 
Significant negative variables include the following: Le-
verage, Liquidity Squared, Capex, Beta and 100% Tag 
Along. These results also support existing literature fin-
dings on dividends. It can thus be concluded that com-
panies that invest more heavily in fixed assets exhibit 
very high liquidity, leverage, and risk levels; less conflict 
between majority and minority shareholders; and a lo-
wer propensity to pay dividends to shareholders.
In the extended model, noteworthy variables with 
positive coefficients include the Majority Control varia-
ble and cases in which the CEO and Chairman of the 
Board roles are performed by the same person, further 
corroborating theories of corporate finance.
It was also noted that features of Brazilian legislation 
on dividends may have affected the results obtained, 
especially results concerning mandatory minimum di-
vidends. Thus, the Logit method was used to examine 
the relationship between the same independent varia-
bles and payouts separated into higher levels (percen-
tages) of dividend distribution (greater than 40% and 
70%) following Martins & Novaes (2012). The following 
question was posed: How do dividend payments above 
the mandatory minimum affect the previously exami-
ned explanatory variables? Will the previous results, 
which are not distinguished by dividend level, be con-
firmed?
This segmented analysis of dividend levels produced 
the following results: significant positive variables in-
clude Size, ROA, Market to Book, Liquidity and Profit 
Growth, and significant negative variables include Li-
quidity2, Poison Pills and 100% Tag Along. Again, for 
the positive indicators, the existing literature on divi-
dends was confirmed. This shows that larger firms of 
higher profitability, market value, liquidity and profit 
growth are more likely to distribute more funds (over 
40% or 70% of the minimum required). The negative 
sign found for Liquidity2 suggests the existence of an 
optimal or peak liquidity level, beyond which compa-
nies restrict dividend payments to maintain it. 
This study offers several contributions to the litera-
ture on determinants of dividend policy in Brazil, as it 
compares the empirical results of two econometric ap-
proaches, thus employing a methodological approach 
unprecedented in the literature that generated results 
consistent with national and international studies. This 
analysis was accompanied by a segmented examination 
of the highest dividend distribution levels based on 
specificities of Brazilian legislation. By revealing asso-
ciations between dividend policies and firm financial 
decisions (investment, financing, available cash volu-
me, capital structure, asset pricing, capital budgeting, 
etc.), this study presented factors that affect dividend 
policy in Brazil. Study limitations include a need for 
further theoretical understanding of equity interest and 
dividend uses for various ownership structures, such as 
pensions and family funds.
Future studies may employ a single corporate go-
vernance variable aggregated into a governance quality 
index to assess various CG mechanisms, thereby correc-
ting possible multicollinearity issues between them wi-
thout using separate variables, as was done in this study. 
This CG indicator would be used in regression models 
with dependent variables that represent dividends to 
more fully assess the relationship between these two 
constructs. 
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